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During the postwar period, many countries have de-tracked their secondary schools, based
on the view that early tracking was unfair. What are the e¢ ciency costs, if any, of de-
tracking schools? To answer this question, we develop a two skills - two jobs model with a
frictional labour market, where new school graduates need to actively search for their best
match. We compute optimal tracking length and the output gain/loss associated to the gap
between actual and optimal tracking length. Using a sample of 18 countries, we ￿nd that:
a) actual tracking length is often longer than optimal, which might call for some e¢ cient
de-tracking; b) the output loss of having a tracking length longer or shorter than optimal
is sizeable, and close to 2 percent of total net output.
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In most education systems in the developed world, heterogeneous pupils are initially mixed
in comprehensive schools - typically primary and lower secondary education. As some
stage of the curriculum, however, some form of (self) selection takes place, typically based
on ability and past performance, and students are allocated to schools which specialize
in di⁄erent curricula (tracks) or to classes where subjects are taught at a di⁄erent level
of di¢ culty (streams). The former system is typical of Central European countries, such
as Germany, Austria, The Netherlands and Hungary, but exists also in Korea and Japan,
and the latter system is typically observed in the US. When no selection whatsoever occurs
during upper secondary school, as in some Scandinavian countries, choice and specialization
are delayed until college education.
For the sake of brevity, we shall call the allocation of students into di⁄erent schools or
classes as "tracking". School tracking was rather widespread both in Europe and in the US
after the Second World War. While Germany is considered as the starkest example of early
tracking, with pupils allocated to tracks at age 10, this was not so di⁄erent in England
or Italy after the War, where students were tracked at 11 (Manning and Pischke, 2006,
Brunello and Checchi, 2006). In the US, this practice began in response to the in￿ ux of
immigrant children during the early 20th century. By mid-century, a majority of secondary
schools in that country used some form of tracking (Hallinan, 2006).
The postwar education system changed rather abruptly in a number of countries. In
Europe, the so called "comprehensive school reform￿led to de-tracking or to a substantial
delay in the tracking time, starting with Sweden, the UK, Italy, and Norway in the 1960s,
and continuing with Finland in the 1970s, France in the 1980s and Spain and Portugal in
the early 1990s. Even the countries which have chosen to retain a system with early strati-
￿cation have taken steps to delay specialization: Germany has introduced both a common
orientation phase in each of the three tracks and a system of comprehensive schools which
are rather widespread in some Lander, and Belgium and the Netherlands have introduced a
common curriculum in the ￿rst stages of secondary education1. In Japan, many vocational
high schools have changed their curricula in the 1980s and added more academic courses,
with a view of facilitating access to college education. In the US, the so-called "de-tracking
movement" began in the 1980s and led to court mandated de-tracking reforms in a number
1See Green, Wolf and Leney, 1999, and Meghir and Palme, 2004, for a detailed discussion.
1of US school districts and states2.
Broadly speaking, the de-tracking movement was driven by the perception, among ed-
ucators and politicians, that early school tracking systems were unfair. It was felt that
privileged children were much more likely to end up in the more demanding academic
tracks, and then in college, at the expense of working class children, who typically ended up
in less demanding and dead-end vocational tracks. Critics of early tracking systems argued
that high-performing students gained at the expense of their lower-performance peers. In
a well known contribution, Oakes, 1992, concluded that tracking was a way of segregating
minority students to lower tracks, and characterized tracking as an elitist practice, that per-
petuated the status quo by giving students from privileged families access to elite colleges
and high-income careers. This view has been recently re￿ned by Bertocchi and Spagat,
2003, who model school design as the outcome of class struggle.
While well placed, the concern with equality of opportunity prompts the following ques-
tion: is there a trade-o⁄between equality of opportunity and e¢ ciency, and if yes, what are
the e¢ ciency costs of de-tracking secondary schools? It is well known that most educators
￿nd that tracking facilitates instruction by making it easier to gear lessons to the ability
level of the whole class. Higher e⁄ectiveness implies that a more demanding curriculum
can be taught, without having to "teach to the middle". When pupils have both academic
and practical or vocational talents, the separation of schools into classes which specialize in
either talent is likely to generate returns from specialization. Since tracking is often done
by (measured) ability, selection generates peer e⁄ects. These e⁄ects are positive for the
high - ability group, because the less able are separated out, and negative for the low ability
- group, because the more able are placed in di⁄erent classes/schools. If peer e⁄ects are
non-linear, so that the gain for the high ability group more than compensates the loss for
the low ability group, then tracking increases e¢ ciency (Minter Hoxby, 2000). However, as
remarked by Manning and Pischke, (2006), ￿...we know very little about the di⁄erent im-
pact of peer group e⁄ects on di⁄erent types of students empirically, so it is di¢ cult to judge
a priori whether this leads to lower or higher average performance in a selective system￿
(p.6).
It seems natural to argue that there are e¢ ciency costs in the de-tracking of secondary
schools if average school performance is higher in tracked systems. Hanushek and Woess-
2We are aware that strati￿cation occurs also between private and public schools, and tracking is only one
dimension of the problem. See Card and Rothstein, 2006.
2mann, 2006, use the standardized cognitive test scores of 15 years old pupils in a large
number of developed countries and show that, on average, performance in these tests is not
a⁄ected by the extent of tracking. Is this the end of the story? We believe there are at
least three reasons why the appropriate answer is no. First, one can argue that looking
at test scores at 15 is too early, as tracking in most countries does not start before 15,
if ever (see Brunello and Checchi, 2006). Second, it might be reductive to focus only on
cognitive skills, as vocational schools in tracked systems develop to a higher extent more
practical and vocational skills. Third, and most important for the purpose of this paper, an
important test of school quality that goes beyond standardized test scores while at school
is earnings and employment prospects after labour market entry (Card and Krueger, 1990).
We conclude that an evaluation of the e¢ ciency costs of school tracking cannot ignore the
transition from school to work.
In this paper we show that the ￿nding that average school performance - measured
by test scores in cognitive skills - is not a⁄ected by the extent of school tracking does not
imply that optimal tracking time should be zero: quite the contrary, in a competitive labour
market with (ex-post) heterogeneous workers and jobs, optimal tracking time should be at
its maximum possible value. We also show that the presence of frictions in the labour
market can induce a central planner which maximizes total net output by choosing the
appropriate education policy to delay tracking with respect to the benchmark frictionless
economy, even in the absence of any concern for equality of opportunity. By implication,
we argue that the evaluation of the e¢ ciency costs of de-tracking schools should take into
proper account the presence of labour market frictions.
We have shown in previous papers (Brunello, Giannini and Ariga, 2004; Ariga, Brunello,
Iwahashi and Rocco, 2005) that complete tracking is not e¢ cient when the allocation of
students to tracks is noisy, so that the more talented students do not necessarily end up in
the academic track. In these papers we have argued that the size of the noise is likely to
be higher the earlier selection takes place, because at the early stages of a pupil￿ s life it is
easier to confound ability with maturity. This argument emphasizes misallocation at school
but ignores mismatch in the labour market.
In this paper we focus instead on the school to work transition. While there is no
misallocation at school, the labour market is not perfectly competitive, but is characterized
by frictions, and by the fact that individuals need to search for the best job match and ￿rms
can post wages to attract applications. In this market, it takes time and other resources for a
3worker to land a good job, and for a ￿rm to ￿ll a vacancy. As surveyed by Rogerson, Shimer
and Wright, 2005, there are di⁄erent ways of characterizing such a market, depending on
the assumptions one makes on the search process and on wage determination. We focus here
on a directed search model, where ￿rms can use their wage policies to attract applicants
and workers can place their job application in a non-random way at a positive cost.
We develop a two-period model of schooling and matching, and contrast the optimal
tracking time which would emerge in a competitive labour market with optimal tracking in
a frictional labour market where search is directed and ￿rms post wages. Using numerical
examples, we show that the latter is shorter than the former. Therefore, a frictional labour
market could induce an e¢ cient reduction of tracking relative to the ￿rst best allocation,
even when no misallocation occurs during the schooling period and the government does
not care about equality of opportunity. We also compute for 18 countries the output
loss generated by the observed school design, which typically deviates from the optimal
design, and ￿nd that this loss is close to 2 percent of total net output. Given that most
developed countries spend about 4-5 percent of their GNP on schooling, this is a sizeable
number. While on average actual tracking length is much shorter than optimal length, there
is substantial cross country heterogeneity, with about half of the countries in our sample
having "too long" tracking, and the other half experiencing the opposite. Less ambiguously,
we ￿nd that the actual share of students enrolled in the academic track is always below the
optimal value.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup and characterizes
schooling. Sections 3 introduces the labour market, and Section 4 describes the properties
of the symmetric equilibrium. Section 5 compares decentralized matching with the social
optimum and discusses policies - such as taxes and subsidies - which could help the govern-
ment to bridge the gap between the two. Finally, Section 6 presents the numerical solutions
based on the more general model. Conclusions follow.
42 Set-up
Since we are interested mainly in the school to work transition, we consider a two period
model without discounting. In the initial period, individuals are young and go to school3.
There are no separations and the match lasts until the economy ￿nishes at the end of
the second period. In the second period, school graduates enter in the labour market,
which consists of an endogenous number of job slots (￿rms). If a satisfactory match occurs,
production takes place and wages are paid. If no match happens, the vacant job slot remains
empty, and school graduates end up in a reservation sector, that pays a given level of income,
which we normalize to zero4.
School consists of a sub-period of comprehensive education, of endogenous length 1 ¬
￿, and of a sub-period of selective education, with individuals allocated to two tracks,
 (academic) and  (vocational). The academic track specializes in the production of
academic skills, and the vocational track specializes in the development of practical skills.
Let ￿ be the share of pupils in the  track. While in principle the schooling period includes
all schooling from primary school to college, it is best to restrict our attention to schooling
until upper secondary education.
In real life, the allocation of students to track is the result of the interaction between
parental decisions, individual decisions and allocation mechanisms decided by the central
or local government, such as admission criteria5. In this model, we drastically simplify the
allocation process by assuming that the government determines ex-ante the number of slots
available in each school. We also assume that individuals are homogeneous, and that the
allocation of pupils to schools is random6. While these are strong simpli￿cations, they allow
us to focus on the school to work transition rather than on the allocation process, which is
much more relevant when equality of opportunity is the question of interest (see Brunello
and Checchi, 2006).
The production technology consists of two jobs,  (general) and  (technical), which
di⁄er in the importance played by academic and vocational skills. Firms choose which job to
3A dynamic version of the model is under preparation.
4Alternatively we could have a wage constraint. Suppose that workers can always ￿nd a job with a given
wage in the secondary labour market. Then no wage o⁄er below the given wage will be accepted. We can
show that most of the analysis below carries through after adequate noirmalization.
5Individuals di⁄er in their innate talent and the allocation process generates a non-random distribution
of abilities in each type of school, which is the source of peer e⁄ects.
6In our model, who goes to which school is irrelevant.
5set up at the beginning of the second period, after having observed the supply of graduates,
and bear a ￿xed setup cost . Search operates as follows: ￿rst, ￿rms announce and commit to
a wage level, which varies between jobs but not within jobs. Second, applicants observe the
posted wage o⁄ers and decide their job application policy, which can deviate from random
applications at a positive cost. Third, ￿rms receive the applications and make o⁄ers. O⁄ers
are accepted7, wages are paid and production takes place. Unmatched individuals go to the
secondary sector. On the other end, unmatched jobs and remain un￿lled.
The timing of the model is as follows: the government decides the optimal composition
of schools into  and  types and the optimal tracking time ￿ so as to maximize expected
total net output. Individuals are allocated to school and complete their education in the
￿rst period8. Firms decide whether to enter in this market and the type of job they wish to
set up. Search occurs in the manner sketched above. Finally, production takes place, wages
are paid and the economy terminates.
2.1 Schooling
Individuals are born with two skills, a general and a vocational skill. While comprehensive
schools teach both skills at the same pace, tracked schools specialize in one skill, which they
teach more e⁄ectively than comprehensive schools. By focusing on a single skill, each track
does not develop the other skill, which su⁄ers with respect to the comprehensive benchmark.
In a world with heterogeneous individuals, the higher e⁄ectiveness of tracked schools could
be generated by the lower variance of abilities in the track, or by the presence of peer e⁄ects.
In the current setup, we entirely by-pass these thorny issues by assuming that individuals
are ex-ante homogeneous.
The technology of production of human capital in schools is given, and depends on
whether the system is comprehensive or strati￿ed. We assume that, when schools are
comprehensive, the human capital accumulated by each pupil in each skill is equal to 1 at
the end of school. With tracking, however, we distinguish whether the attended school is
academic or vocational. In the former case, accumulated human capital in the academic
7As discussed below, o⁄ers are never rejected
8We assume that on the job training cannot completely undo the relative advantage that each type of
graduate has for a job type.
6skill is9

 = 1 + ￿
￿ (1)
and in the vocational skill is10





 are given parameters. In reality, ￿

 depend on school resources, that are
controlled by the government. In our model, however, we treat these resources as given,
and assume that the government can only choose the technology of production - either
comprehensive or strati￿ed - and the composition of pupils in each track when schooling is
strati￿ed. This is a simpli￿ed assumption, which sharpens our focus on the comparison of
alternative school designs by setting school resources as given.
By spending a fraction of schooling time ￿ in the academic track, pupils improve their
academic skills relative to a comprehensive school at the rate ￿
, at the price of having less
developed vocational skills. The stock of these skills declines at the rate ￿
 with the time
spent in an academic track. The opposite occurs for pupils enrolled in vocational tracks.
In this case we have respectively





 = 1 ¬ ￿
 ￿ (4)
A special but interesting case that we shall consider at length in the paper is ￿

 = ￿.
This case has the convenient property that average individual human capital is constant
(and equal to 1) across comprehensive and tracked schools.
This property implies that, on average, each individual does not gain in terms on human
capital from a higher degree of tracking, consistently with the empirical results of Hanushek
9With (1¬ ￿) of the time spent in a comprehensive school, accumulated human capital is 






  1, which we re-write as 

 = 1 + (￿

 ¬ 1)￿ = 1 + ￿

￿
10Accumulated human capital is 





  1, which we re-write as 

 = 1 ¬ (1 ¬
￿

)￿ = 1 ¬ ￿

￿
7and Woessmann, 200611. Moreover, when pupils are uniformly distributed between tracks,
average academic skills do not depend on tracking length, again consistent with Hanushek
and Woessmann, 2006.
2.2 Jobs
The production technology is linear, with one unit of output produced by one unit of human














so that graduates of  schools are more productive at type  jobs, and graduates of 







so that jobs of type  yield higher output when matched with  graduates, and jobs of
type  produce more with  graduates.
3 Matching
Our characterization of job matching with two job types and two worker types follows
previous work by Shi, 2002, and Shimer, 2005. Following Shi, 2002, we assume that ￿rms
having the same job type post the same wage for each worker type, and workers having the
same school record select the same application probabilities. This assumption implies that
all the heterogeneity we are concerned with is between jobs and school types. Shi justi￿es
11Notice however that Hanushek and Woessmann consider only academic skills.
8this with the presence of a large number of workers and jobs, and with the fact that it
is di¢ cult for agents to coordinate their decisions in a large market. This is equivalent
to restrict our attention to "..symmetric, mixed strategy equilibria where ex-ante identical
￿rms and workers use the same strategy..."12 (p.470).
We start with some notation. At the end of the ￿rst period, there exists a unit mass
of graduates, with a share ￿ coming from  schools and the share 1 ¬ ￿ coming from 
schools. The number of vacant job slots for each job type is  and  respectively. Let ￿
be the share of of type  vacancies on total vacancies , so that ￿ = 
 . Each worker has a
single application at hand, and she can control the probability that such application lands
on the preferred job slot13. Firms receive applications for their job slot, and select one - if
any - for a job o⁄er, which is certainly accepted.
3.1 The ball urn matching mechanism
Denote with 





 = 1 
 + 
 = 1 0 ￿ 

 ￿ 1 (5)
For simplicity, we also write  = 
  = 
 . Denote by 

 the total ￿ ow of applications




 = (1 ¬ )￿

 =  (1 ¬ ￿)

 = (1 ¬  )(1 ¬ ￿) (6)
We de￿ne the queue length ￿

 as the ratio of applications  to job slots . More in detail
12Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005, argue that in large markets the mixed strategy equilibrium is the
natural outcome. This introduces a coordination friction, as more than one worker can apply for the same
job.
13The assumption that each worker has only one application in hand is not only crucial for the tractability
of the subsequent analysis, but also for its normative implications. If, as Albrecht and co-authors, 2003, do,
we allow workers to send multiple applications, then they may reject some of the received o⁄ers, thereby















If workers do not spend any e⁄ort to control the probability  applications are dis-
tributed randomly over available job slots so that  = ￿,  = 1 ¬ ￿: Since ￿

 is the
average number of applications by type  workers per type  job slot, in a large market the




















) = 1 ¬   (￿

) (8)
is the probability that a vacancy of type  receives at least one applications from type
 worker. There are four distinct cases to consider: a job slot receives applications a) from




 ); b) only from type 

















; d) from no worker, with probability
h









each worker can receive at best only one o⁄er, o⁄ers are never rejected.







 ¬  (9)
A crucial aspect for the subsequent analysis is how ￿rms rank worker types. Later in
the paper we show that, if 

  
 , then ￿

  ￿
 is also true. This implies that ￿rms with
a job slot  receiving applications both from workers  and  strictly prefer to send their


















= 1 ¬ exp(¬￿

)
10the probabilities that an application generates an o⁄er vary with the type of worker and




























(1 ¬   (￿

 )) (10)
To illustrate, consider type  graduates. They are the preferred choice of type  job
slots, but the second choice of type  slots. Therefore, the probability that an application
sent by one of these graduates generates an o⁄er from a type  job slot is equal to the





, divided by the number of
applications per job slot ￿





. Next consider type  graduates. If they send
their application to job slots , they will receive an o⁄er only conditional on no application
from the other type of graduates. Since the latter event occurs with probability (1 ¬   (￿

))










Individuals are risk neutral and maximize their expected income, net of the cost of deviating
from random matching. They search for jobs using mixed strategies, which consist of placing
their applications to either type of job with a positive probability. We de￿ne the cost of
deviating from random applications in such a way as to rule out corner solutions, that is,
application strategies that concentrate on a single job. The expected utility is
 = 

 + (1 ¬  )

 ¬ ￿(￿) (11)
where











for type  graduates, and
 =  
 
 + (1 ¬  )
 





2 [(1 + )exp(¬) ¬ 1]  0 ; lim
!0














for type  graduates.



























 ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)
 (1 ¬  )
(14)
The rather unusual speci￿cation of the costs ￿ of controlling applications in (11) and
(12) rules out corner solutions for the probabilities  and  , and the possibility that
the marginal search costs in (13) and (14) explode. Further discussion on this working
hypothesis is relegated to Section 1 in the Appendix at the end of the paper.
Each type of worker chooses these probabilities so as to equate the marginal bene￿t to
the marginal cost of the e⁄ort required16. It is useful to re-write these conditions as follows

 ¬ 





 =  
 ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)












































 are the expected returns from applying to di⁄erent jobs. When the cost of deviating
from random matching can be disregarded (  = 0), as assumed in competitive search
models, school graduates select their application policies so as to arbitrage away di⁄erences
16Notice that each individual worker takes the probability 

 of receiving an o⁄er as given, since this
probability is the result of the aggregate behavior of all labour market participants. Clearly, 

 is endogenous
and determined at the equilibrium.
12in expected returns. This opportunity is partially precluded by the presence of positive
costs (   0), which grant ￿rms a monopsonistic position in their wage posting policy. We
shall see below that this has important implications on e¢ ciency.
3.3 Firms
Firms with job slots post wages subject to the application strategy of workers (eq.(13)).
Each ￿rm knows that by altering the wage o⁄ered to each worker type, it can a⁄ect the
arrival rate of job applications by both worker types. Job slot  yields expected pro￿ts
equal to
L =   (￿
)(
 ¬ 
) +   (￿
 )(1 ¬   (￿
))(
 ¬ 
 ) ¬  (17)
where  is the cost of setting up a job. Replacing the wages in (15) with (13) and using
(14) allows us to re-write this expression as




























Importantly, each employer with a job slot  assumes that she cannot a⁄ect expected
values 
 and 
 , which accrue to the other job, even though these values are endogenous
to the model and determined at equilibrium (see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005, for a
similar hypothesis). Each employer maximizes pro￿ts by choosing the queue length of each






































2 ¬ 2 + 
2(1 ¬ )2  0
13The ￿rst order condition for ￿
 is similar
  0(￿



















































































So far, we have taken it for granted that ￿rms with a type  job slot prefer to hire
a type  graduate. Actually, this is not obvious. Although output in the match of a 
job with a  graduate is higher than in a match with a  graduate, the ￿rm hiring a 
graduate may have to pay a relatively high wage to attract such worker, and end up with
a lower net pro￿t. Fortunately, the lemma below shows that this event does not occur.















0) for  6= 0
Proof. See Section 2 in the Appendix.
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3.4 Zero Pro￿t Conditions
While ￿rms have some monopsonistic power in the labour market, there are no barriers to
entry in the product market, and new ￿rms and job slots are driven to enter or exit the
market by the presence of expected positive or negative pro￿ts. To tie down the number of
vacancies, we need the following zero pro￿t condition for job 
￿ =   (￿
)(
 ¬ 
) +   (￿
 )(1 ¬   (￿
))(
 ¬ 
 ) ¬  = 0
















































































Finally, the total number of applications must be equal to the total number of applicants,




(1 ¬ ￿) = ￿ (26)
￿
 (1 ¬ ￿) + ￿
 ￿ = 1 ¬ ￿ (27)





 ,  and ￿. This completes the description of the model.
4 The Symmetric Equilibrium
In order to be able to provide an analytical treatment of the equilibrium, we simplify the
model by imposing that ￿

 = ￿. This is equivalent to assuming

 = 
 = 1 and 
 = 
 = 2
These restrictions imply that the output gain from a more productive match relative to
a less productive match is the same, independently of the type of job and skill. It turns out












 = ￿2 (28)
This equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that the two jobs,  and , specialize to the
same extent in the use of one of the two available skills. Therefore, application rates di⁄er
not across jobs but only between the most preferred and the less preferred match. Vacancy
creation is such that half of the new vacancies is in job  and the other half is in job .
Since ￿ is a policy parameter, this equilibrium requires that the government, which designs
the school system, sets the number of slots in each track so as to equalize the composition
of graduates from each track with the composition of vacancies. Therefore, ￿ = 1
2.
164.1 Existence and Uniqueness of the Symmetric Equilibrium
Under symmetry, conditions (22) and (23) are equivalent, and eq. (22) can be written as



































2(￿1)3 ¬ 3(￿1)2 + 3￿1 ¬ 1
2(￿1)2(1 ¬ ￿1)2
or
exp[¬￿1](1 ¬ 2) =  
2(￿1)3 ¬ 3(￿1)2 + 3￿1 ¬ 1
2(￿1)2(1 ¬ ￿1)2
The two zero pro￿t conditions (24) and (25) are also equivalent. Under symmetry, we
have
￿ = ￿ = 1 ¬  (￿1)(1 ¬ 2) ¬  (￿1 + ￿2)

+ 
2(￿1)2 ¬ ￿1 + 1
2
2(1 ¬ ￿1)2 +  
2(￿2)2 ¬ ￿2 + 1
2
2(1 ¬ ￿2)2 = 
Using the adding up constraint (￿1 + ￿2) = 1 the symmetric equilibrium is charac-
terized by the following system of two equations and two unknowns:












2(￿1)2 ¬ 2￿1 + 1
￿2
2 [￿1(1 ¬ ￿1)]
2 =  (29)
exp[¬￿1](1 ¬ 2) =  
2(￿1)3 ¬ 3(￿1)2 + 3￿1 ¬ 1
2(￿1)2(1 ¬ ￿1)2 (30)
We show the following






Proof. See Section 4 in the Appendix.
4.2 The Benchmark: Competitive Symmetric Equilibrium
Before discussing the properties of the symmetric equilibrium with frictions, it is useful to
characterize the competitive equilibrium with no frictions as the benchmark case. When
workers can immediately locate their preferred job, the monopsonistic power of ￿rms in a
world with frictions - which allows them to post wages in order to in￿ uence the size of job
queues - dissolves. In such equilibrium, graduates from school  work with certainty in
jobs , and graduates of schools  work with certainty in jobs . With only these matches
taking place, wages do not vary across jobs and are determined by the zero pro￿t condition
1 ¬  = 
With ￿rms making zero pro￿ts, net output in this economy is simply
 = 1 + ￿￿ ¬ 
which allows us to establish the following remark
Remark 1 When the labour market is perfectly competitive and ￿rms make zero pro￿ts in
equilibrium, it is optimal to start school tracking as early as possible (￿ = 1).
From the vintage point of competitive equilibrium with no frictions, policies which delay
tracking because of equality of opportunity incur e¢ ciency losses.
5 Decentralized Matching versus Social E¢ ciency
In the matching model described in this paper, ￿rms have monopsonistic power and post
wages, and workers queue for their preferred jobs. In this section, we compare the outcome
18of the decentralized equilibrium with the outcome which would obtain if the government
could allocate workers to jobs and set the number of vacancies, using the same matching
technology. This implies that the government can determine both queue lengths ￿1 and ￿2,
total vacancies  and the distribution of vacancies between the two jobs, ￿. Re-write ￿rst
the two key conditions for the symmetric decentralized equilibrium:





2 +  
￿1
￿
22 ¬ 2 + 1
￿2
23(1 ¬ )2 =  ((29￿ ))
exp[¬￿1](1 ¬ 2) =  
(2 ¬ 1)(2 ¬  + 1)
22(1 ¬ )2 ((30￿ ))







The corresponding conditions for optimal policy are17





2 =  (31)
exp[¬￿1](1 ¬ 2) =
  (2 ¬ 1)
2(1 ¬ )
(32)
By comparing these conditions we establish the following
Proposition 2 Denote by * the optimal policy, and by y the matching equilibrium. First,






i.e., in the decentralized matching equilibrium job queues are shorter and vacancies more
abundant than in the socially optimal equilibrium.
Proof. See Section 6 of the Appendix.
Optimal policy and the matching equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 1. Here, we
￿nd it convenient to use the plane (￿1  ￿ ￿1) As shown in the Appendix, the ￿rst
order condition for ￿1 is negatively sloped both in the matching equilibrium (we call it
"Foc match" in the ￿gure) and in the command economy ("Foc opt"). Moreover, the latter
17The derivation is in Section 5 of the Appendix.
19Figure 1: Matching Equilibrium and Socially Optimal Policy
is always strictly above the former. On the other hand, the zero pro￿t condition in the
command economy ("V opt") is positively sloped, and lies strictly above the zero pro￿t
condition for the matching equilibrium ("V match"), which is hump-shaped and with a slope
which in absolute value is smaller than the slope of "Foc match" Thus, the combination
(￿1￿1) in the command economy, described by point , lies above the combination in
the matching equilibrium, which is at point  Moreover, point  lies always below "Foc
opt". This proves the ranking of queue lengths. Moreover, the slope of the lines connecting
the origin with  and  is equal to (1
) Clearly, the slope of the line passing through  is
higher than the slope of the line passing through  This proves the relationship between
vacancies.
Such result is easy to interpret: under the decentralized matching equilibrium, job slots
earn monopsonistic pro￿ts, which can only be diluted away by excessive entry of ￿rms
creating new vacancies. Applicant queues are too short as a result. The other side of the
coin is the sub-optimal level of adjustment in the application probability, re￿ ecting the fact
that the wage di⁄erential between the more and the less productive match is smaller than
20the socially optimal level, due to monopsonistic wage setting. Inspection of the ￿rst order
conditions also reveals the following
Lemma 2 The decentralized matching equilibrium is constrained ine¢ cient when    0
Proof. Straightforward from comparison of (29￿ ), (30￿ ), (31) and (32).
Job slots in the decentralized matching model face an upward sloping quasi - supply
schedule. In the standard competitive search model, where   = 0, ￿rms can choose the
arbitrary size of the queue as far as they o⁄er the equilibrium expected return. Just as
monopsonistic ￿rms have to increase their wage o⁄ers to attract more workers, the ￿rms in
our model have to pay a higher expected return to increase the number of applicants.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in    the cost of adjusting application probabilities, increases
pro￿ts, because such an increase reduces the response of the queue to a change in the
expected return from each application: i.e., the supply (job application) schedule becomes
less elastic. Since the wedge between labor productivity and wage is increasing in the
inverse of supply elasticity (it vanishes as the supply becomes in￿nitely elastic), pro￿ts are
increasing in   
The distortions typical of a search market result in excessive pro￿ts and hence in ex-
cessive entry of vacancies in the market. It is a feature of our matching model that the
equilibrium fails to achieve constrained social e¢ ciency, unlike the standard competitive
search model (see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005). Moreover, the ine¢ ciency is such
that there are too many vacancies and too few applicants per job slot. Given monopsonistic
wage setting, workers under-invest in adjusting their application probabilities. Hence we
have excessive mismatch.
5.1 Features of the Symmetric Equilibrium
One feature of the symmetric equilibrium is that total employment is increasing in the
number of vacancies. Using the fact that ￿1 + ￿2 = 1
, total employment  is given by








and the employment/vacancy rate 
 decreases as vacancy creation speeds up.






=  [1 ¬   (￿1)]  0
and total employment does not depend on the application rate. A higher application rate by
workers  and  to jobs  and  increases the number of successful matches and reduces
the number of less successful matches (of workers  with  jobs and workers  with 
jobs).
5.2 Optimal Tax Policy
The decentralized equilibrium in our model not only generates mismatch but also fails to
achieve constrained e¢ ciency. This is due to the fact that ￿rms have some monopsonistic
power in their wage posting, which a⁄ects the application strategy selected by workers.
As a result, in the symmetric equilibrium job queues for the most productive matches
are too short and vacancies are too many, compared to the constrained social optimum.
Facing this outcome, the government could try to attain the constrained social optimum by
using an appropriate combination of taxes and transfers. There is a small literature which
explicitly considers taxes and education as alternative tools to attain equity and e¢ ciency,
with a special emphasis on redistribution (see for instance Benabou, 2002, and Hanushek,
Ka Yui Leung and Tilmaz, 2003). Here, we are not concerned with redistribution, but
with e¢ ciency, and in particular with the existence of a proper combination of taxes and
subsidies which can allow the government to attain the constrained social optimum for any
education policy in place.
For this to happen, we need two instruments. Suppose that the government can always
meet his budget constraint, either by raising revenue with non-distortionary taxation or
by giving away lump sum subsidies so as to dispose of excessive revenue. First, we know
that in the decentralized equilibrium workers do not adjust adequately their application
probabilities in the direction of the most productive matches, because of the compression of
the wage distribution induced by monopsonistic wage setting. A negative income tax - or a
wage subsidy - can be used to increase the wage premium and provide the right incentives
to job searchers. To illustrate, consider equation (13), which describes the optimal choice
of application probabilities in the absence of taxes and subsidies, and let  be the subsidy
paid to each type of graduate. Wages gross of subsidy for type  graduates are
22e 
 = (1 + )
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e 
 = (1 + )
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(1 +  )
￿
 ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)
 (1 ¬  )
￿
Second, we notice that the other source of ine¢ ciency is excessive entry by ￿rms, because
job slots earn excessive pro￿ts due to their monopsonistic power in the labor market. To
correct this ine¢ ciency, the government can impose a tax on vacancy creation, . Consider
the symmetric matching equilibrium. The following Proposition shows that there exists a
combination of subsidies and taxes which can move the matching equilibrium to the socially
e¢ cient allocation.
Proposition 3 Denote by (￿1￿2 ) the socially optimal values of (￿1￿2)Then con-
strained e¢ ciency can be restored starting from the decentralized symmetric matching equi-
librium by using the following wage subsidy  and tax on vacancies 




 = ￿(￿1￿2￿) ¬ ￿(￿1￿2￿) (35)
where
  ￿  
"
 ￿1 ¬ 1
2
￿1(1
2 ¬ ￿V ￿1)
#
¬ ￿   [2￿V ￿1￿1 (2￿V ￿11 ¬ ￿)]
¬  [￿(1 ¬ 2￿V ￿11 ¬ ￿) + (1 ¬ 2￿V ￿1)￿1 (1 ¬ 2￿V ￿11 ¬ ￿)]
23￿ ￿  
￿
2
[log(2￿1) ¬ log(2￿1)] +  
￿
2
[log(2￿2) ¬ log(2￿2)] = 0
￿ ￿ 2  ￿V ￿2
1￿1 (2￿V ￿1￿) + 2  ￿V ￿2
2￿1 (2￿V ￿2￿)
Proof. See Section 7 of the Appendix
In the symmetric equilibrium, queue lengths to the most productive match are too short
and the number of vacancies is too large compared to the socially optimal policy. Hence,
the government needs to set up a wage subsidy to encourage additional search by school
graduates, and a tax to discourage vacancy creation.
How big are these taxes and subsidies? In the symmetric equilibrium, the optimal
subsidy is given by
1 +  =
¬(￿ )
  (￿ )
=  
(2 ¬ 1)(2 ¬  + 1)
22(1 ¬ )2 ￿




22 ¬ 2 + 1
(1 ¬ )
￿ 2 since  ￿ ￿1 ￿
1
2
The optimal tax on vacancy creation is instead
 =  
￿1
￿
22 ¬ 2 + 1
￿2
23(1 ¬ )2
To illustrate with a numerical example, let   = 01 = 1￿1 = 7; then  = 038It follows
that constrained e¢ ciency can be restored only with a very large subsidy, equal at least
to twice the wage. This, and the fact that taxes and subsidies are used for redistribution,
suggests that in practice constrained e¢ ciency is not attained, and that the government
operates its education choices subject to the decentralized equilibrium.
6 The General Model: Numerical Solutions
The symmetric model is tractable enough for us to derive analytical results concerning
existence and uniqueness, as well as the key properties of the decentralized equilibrium vis
a vis the socially optimal outcome. When we drop symmetry and go back to the general
model, however, tractability is lost, and we are forced to illustrate the properties of the
general model using numerical solutions. The general model contains two policy variables,
￿ and ￿, six parameters: ￿

,  =  ,  = ,   and , and four endogenous variables:
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 ￿
 ,  and ￿: We reduce the space of parameters by imposing the following restrictions







Therefore, we allow the "productivity of tracking", measured by parameter ￿, to vary
between tracks, but impose that the rate of accumulation or de-cumulation of skills within
each track is the same.
6.1 Total Net Output and Taxes with Decentralized Matching and in the
Command Economy
Before discussing how we proceed to estimate the vector of parameters, we compare total
output net of hiring and search costs in the decentralized and in the command economy
equilibrium when each parameter is allowed to vary with respect to a baseline con￿guration.
Let this baseline be
￿ = ￿ = 008;   = 005;  = 035; ￿ = 05; ￿ = 05
where we also ￿x the policy variables, and allow one parameter at a time to vary while
the rest remains constant at the baseline. The results are illustrated in Figure 2. As
expected, total net output is always higher in the command economy equilibrium than
in the decentralized matching equilibrium: by directly selecting vacancies, queue lengths
and wages, the government can eliminate the ine¢ ciencies associated to excessive vacancy
creation and limited search activity, and reduce the share of bad matches. However, total
employment is higher in the decentralized equilibrium than in the command optimum,
due to the excessive production of vacancies in the former case. Notice that net output
decreases both in the decentralized and in the command equilibrium when the costs of
setting up vacancies and of searching for the right match increase, and increases when the
productivity of human capital formation in the academic track is allowed to raise.
The general version of our model accommodates two types of mismatch: the ￿rst type
is the mismatch between worker types and job types which occurs when the total supply
of each type of worker is equal to the total demand. In the symmetric model, ￿ = ￿,
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Figure 3: The supply of A graduates and the imbalance between demand and supply
model when ￿ 6= ￿;and implies that the supply of each worker type does not match the
(endogenous) demand. We call this second type of mismatch imbalance, and we illustrate
in Figure 3 how it varies with changes in the share ￿, both with decentralized matching and
in the command economy.
First of all, in both matching equilibrium and command economy, the absolute size of
the imbalance increases as we deviate from the symmetric case ￿ = 1
2. In both equilibria,
an increase in ￿ brings about a more than proportionate increase in demand, measured
by the share ￿ of vacancies for type G jobs. By the same token, if the supply of the 
skill is reduced below 1
2, the demand is reduced even more. Interestingly enough, this
￿ overshooting￿phenomenon is even more pronounced in the command economy. The other
side of the coin is the virtual invariance of the total number of mismatches 
 + 
 as ￿
varies, implying that an increase in the mismatch of one type of worker is largely o⁄set by a
counter-balancing decline in the mismatch of the other type of worker. To put it di⁄erently,
in both equilibria the matching mechanism minimizes total mismatch, and ￿rms respond
strongly to changes in supply by adjusting the type of job slots on o⁄er. Notice that shifting
27the share of vacancies from one type of job to the other is costless18.
If our numerical examples are a good indication of the more general properties of the
matching equilibrium described in the paper, one intriguing implication is that policy dis-
cussions about mismatch in the labor market, which typically focus on imbalances between
supply and demand for each type of skill, are somewhat misplaced, as mismatch can occur
even in the absence of such imbalances.
Finally, we ask what would be the combination of wage subsidies and taxes on job slots
that would allow the decentralized equilibrium to attain the command economy. Again, we
keep the policy variables and the productivity of human capital formation at their baseline
values and allow   and  to vary about their baseline values. As illustrated by Figure 4,
it turns out that the wage subsidy required to attain the social optimum is remarkably
high, at about 60 times the wage. On the other hand, the tax on job slots varies with the
underlying parameters in the range between 10 and 40 percent of output.
What should we conclude from this? Clearly, the estimated wage subsidies are unrea-
sonably high. This result, and the common observation that taxation is used mainly for
redistribution, suggests that attaining the social optimum by combining taxes and subsi-
dies is either not feasible or not consistent with actual government policy. We take stock
by limiting our numerical solutions of the model to the decentralized matching equilibrium.
6.2 Numerical solution: the strategy
One straightforward strategy would be to produce independent estimates of the parameters,
and use these estimates to solve the model for the endogenous variables. Unfortunately,
this is a close to impossible task for some of the parameters, such as   and ￿ , for which
we have no clear empirical counterpart. The former enters in the measure of the cost of
search faced by job searchers, and the latter measures the productivity of vocational schools
in the production of vocational skills. While we do have statistics on cognitive skills, our
information on non - cognitive skills is still at its infancy19. An alternative strategy is
to treat these parameters as unknowns, and estimate them using a minimum distance
estimator, which minimizes the distance between the numerical and actual value of some
18Total vacancies do not change very much anyway in both equilibria.
19See for instance Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006.
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Figure 4: Taxes and subsidies as functions of the key parameters
29measurable indicator. A natural candidate is employment in jobs  and . Based on our
model, this is given by
 = 
 + 
 =  ￿
  (￿
) +   (￿






 =  ￿
  (￿
 ) +   (￿




Suppose that our empirical sample of observations on sectorial employment covers 
countries, and denote as  = f
 
 g,  = 12 , the vector of observed employment


































 ) and 
 and b 
,  = , are the actual and computed
values of employment in each sector. Further assume that the policy variables are set at
their actual valuesThen the parameters of interest are obtained by minimizing the weighted
sum of the distance between computed and actual employment in each sector
f  ￿￿ g = argmin[]
To implement this strategy, we need empirical information on employment in  and 
jobs, and estimates of actual tracking time ￿ and the share of students in academic tracks
￿.
6.3 The Data
We collect data on employment by job type, tracking time and the share of students in the
academic track for a sample of 20 countries, which spans 4 continents and covers mainly
developed countries. Since we need employment in  and  jobs, we need ￿rst of all
to map existing occupations into the two jobs. We proceed by selecting two benchmark
countries, Germany and the US, and by restricting our attention to high school and college
graduates. Our data for Germany are from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP). For the US, we use the March supplements of the Current Population Survey. For
30both countries, we select the years 1996 and 2000, and average our results to smooth away
potential business cycle e⁄ects.
For the US, we include in the high school category the individuals with some college
but no degree as well as those with an associate degree. We eliminate public sector jobs
and retain only individuals aged 25 to 34, who are most likely to be in the transition
from school to work. We also assign some occupations to the secondary labour market,
which in our model is observationally equivalent to unemployment. These occupations
include agricultural work, sales and services, plant assembly and elementary blue collar
jobs. Among the remaining occupations, we assign to  jobs the occupations where the
percentage of employees with a college degree is higher than 50%. The underlying idea
is that individuals enrolled in academic tracks are much more likely to go on to college
than individuals enrolled in vocational tracks. The remaining occupations are assigned
to  jobs. For the US, the occupations mapped to  jobs are managers, executives and
professionals, where the percentage of college graduates in the year 2000 was 56% and 78%
respectively. On the other hand, the occupations mapped into  jobs are technicians, clerks
and specialized blue collar labor. Since Germany turns out to have a distribution of college
graduates by occupation similar to the US, we con￿rm the same mapping, and extend such
mapping to the other countries in the dataset.
To obtain  and  we compute the total labor force by adding to employment the
unemployed and those assigned to the secondary sector, and divide actual employment in the
two jobs by this total. It is impossible to cover 20 countries with the same dataset. We use
the ECHP for most European countries, and the tabulations from ILO (www.laborsta.org)
for the rest of the sample. Needless to say, available tabulations do not ￿t perfectly our
selection of data, especially with reference to educational attainment and public versus
private employment. Compared to US and ECHP data, our estimates for the rest of the
sample covers both public and private sector and all educational groups, but restrict age to
less than 35.
The data on ￿ and ￿ are drawn from Table 1 in Brunello and Checchi, 2006. Track-
ing length is measured as the percentage of total schooling time from primary to upper
secondary education spent in a tracked school, and refers to the year 2002. Notice that
we have assigned the value 0 to both ￿ and ￿ in the United States and Canada. This is
not to say that US schools do not have tracking. However, since tracking occurs within a
comprehensive schooling system, there is no obvious measure that we can use. Therefore,
31we exclude this country - as well as Canada - from the numerical exercise, thereby reducing
the number of available countries to 18. The table reports for the same year the share of
students in upper secondary general education, and data on average tax rates on earnings
- both drawn from OECD sources. Since actual employment subsidies expressed as shares
of GDP are very small in most countries, we set them to zero as a ￿rst approximation.
Table 1. Values of employment shares, taxes, subsidies, tracking length and share of
students in general tracks.
Country   ￿ ￿ 
Austria .109 .588 .154 .370 .240
Belgium .239 .439 .667 .273 .141
Canada .212 .437 0 1 .166
France .178 .535 .250 .437 .154
Germany .156 .548 .692 .370 .209
Italy .085 .492 .385 .732 .181
Japan .187 .532 .250 .751 .066
Spain .190 .376 .167 .720 .140
UK .359 .426 .154 .279 .174
US .320 .297 0 1 .157
Finland .288 .373 .250 .428 .249
Denmark .196 .522 .250 .470 .304
Holland .397 .399 .500 .308 .105
Ireland .265 .391 .182 .763 .126
Greece .171 .393 .250 .600 .056
Portugal .245 .514 .250 .712 .101
Russian Fed .133 .564 .217 .671 .13
Poland .119 .472 .385 .391 .064
Mexico .044 .487 .455 .886 .063
New Zealand .154 .465 .154 .628 .205
6.4 The Results
With 18 available data points, we cannot possibly produce country speci￿c estimates of all
the parameters. A more modest approach is to ￿x ￿ and  to be constant across countries
and allow   to take three di⁄erent values, starting from some initial value. Let    ,    and
   be the low, medium and high value of   . Conditional on the policy and tax variables
32taking their actual observed values, the minimum distance estimator produces the following
estimates
￿ = 0; ￿ = 0065;  = 035;    = 0018;    = 0046;    = 0095
Interestingly, the distance between actual and simulated employment in jobs  and
 is minimized when the productivity of human capital formation is signi￿cantly higher
in the vocational track, which specializes in the production of vocational skills, than in
the academic track, which is not signi￿cantly more e⁄ective than the comprehensive track
in the production of cognitive skills. This empirical result squares well with the ￿ndings
by Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006, that tracking does not a⁄ect average performance in
cognitive test scores, and implies that the gains from specialization accruing to tracking, if
any, lie in the less prestigious and practically oriented track.
With these estimates in hand, we solve the model for the endogenous variables, includ-
ing employment in the two jobs and total net output. Table 2 compares actual employment
shares with the computed values for each country in the sample. It turns out that the
correlation between actual and computed values is rather high for  jobs (087) but some-
what lower for  jobs (053). Overall, we take these results as indicating that our model
￿ts reasonably well actual data, and that this ￿t is signi￿cantly better for technical jobs
typically ￿lled by individuals with vocational skills.
33Table 2. Values of actual and predicted employment shares.
Country actual  estimated  actual  estimated 
Austria .109 .099 .588 .594
Belgium .239 .257 .439 .462
France .178 .091 .535 .550
Germany .156 .221 .548 .494
Italy .085 .109 .492 .525
Japan .187 .125 .532 .497
Spain .190 .253 .376 .394
UK .359 .311 .426 .392
Finland .288 .310 .373 .401
Denmark .196 .112 .522 .529
Holland .397 .223 .399 .480
Ireland .265 .271 .391 .374
Greece .171 .301 .393 .390
Portugal .245 .121 .514 .505
Russian Fed .133 .125 .564 .500
Poland .119 .251 .472 .445
Mexico .044 .134 .487 .486
New Zealand .154 .150 .465 .472
Finally, we ask what are the values of the education policy variables, ￿ and ￿, which
maximize total net output under the estimated con￿guration of parameters. These values
are reported in Table 3 below, together with the percentage deviation between total net
output when the policy variables are at their optimum level, and total net output when the
policy variables take their current value. Our results suggests the following:
￿ optimal track length when the labour market is frictional is generally shorter than in a
hypothetical country characterized by a perfectly competitive labour market, possibly
with the exception of Belgium. The gap is rather small in Germany, Finland and the
UK, but quite large in France, Denmark, Austria and New Zealand;
￿ on average, actual tracking length (0331) is much shorter than the level which max-
imizes total output in a decentralized matching equilibrium (0471). However, this
average masks substantive cross country heterogeneity: in about half of the countries
in our sample, actual tracking length is too long compared with the e¢ cient length.
The opposite occurs in the remaining half of the sample. These ￿ndings warn us
against drawing easy conclusions on whether the current tracking length is "too long"
34or "too short". We are afraid that the existing relationship between total net out-
put and tracking time in imperfectly competitive labour markets is too complex to
warrant easy generalizations;
￿ on average, the actual share of pupils in the academic track (0530) is much lower
than the level which maximizes total output in a decentralized matching equilibrium
(0870). Compared to tracking length, this result is less ambiguous, as optimal ￿ is
always larger than actual ￿. How do explain this? Again, the relationship between net
output and ￿ is complex, but we speculate that, by increasing the share of students in
academic schools, who have more versatile skills (￿ = 0) than students in vocational
schools (￿  0), the government can reduce the output losses generated by bad
matches20.
￿ on average, the output loss incurred by having both a tracking time and a share
of students in the academic track di⁄erent from their optimal values is close to 2
percentage points of total net output, a sizeable loss, especially if we consider that
most developed OECD countries spend between 4 and 5 percent of their GNP for
public education.
20When both ￿ and ￿ are set at their optimal values, the supply of vacancies declines, and the share of 
jobs increases.
35Table 3. Values of actual and optimal education variables, and percentage output loss.
Country actual ￿ optimal ￿ actual ￿ optimal ￿ % output loss
Austria .667 .031 .277 .522 7.9
Belgium .500 .998 .299 .891 2.6
France .250 .074 .437 .799 2.4
Germany .692 .969 .370 .904 4.2
Italy .385 .206 .732 .979 1.3
Japan .250 .151 .751 .976 0.6
Spain .167 .710 .620 .969 0.3
UK .154 .921 .279 .906 0.4
Finland .250 .958 .428 .893 0.4
Denmark .250 .029 .470 .830 2.0
Holland .500 .895 .308 .916 3.6
Ireland .182 .165 .763 .872 0
Greece .250 .839 .600 .919 0.3
Portugal .182 .141 .712 .973 1.0
Russian Fed .250 .116 .671 .961 1.0
Poland .250 .812 .391 .915 1.6
Mexico .455 .405 .886 .991 0.6
New Zealand .154 .074 .628 .949 0.6
7 Conclusions
An important pattern in school design after the second world war has been the detracking
of secondary schools, motivated mainly by equity considerations: early tracking systems
generate early strati￿cation, with working class students con￿ned to less prestigious and
rewarding vocational schools, and students from privileged families having access to more
elitist academic tracks and college.
As usual, equity comes at a price in terms of e¢ ciency. We have argued in this paper
that one cannot evaluate the relative e¢ ciency of school tracking by looking only at what
happens in schools. The transition from school to work is also important. In an ideal
frictionless labour market, such transition is so smooth that it might be e¢ cient to push
tracking to cover the full length of schooling. We show that, in a more realistic imperfectly
competitive labour market with frictions, the hazards in the transition from school to work
may lead governments to delay tracking, even in the absence of equity considerations. This
has two implications: ￿rst, an alternative interpretation of the de-tracking movement can
be framed in terms of e¢ ciency, rather than equality of opportunity; second, deviations
36from complete tracking driven by equity considerations do not necessarily entail e¢ ciency
losses, as it might be e¢ cient to delay tracking with respect to the benchmark model with
perfectly competitive labour markets.
Our characterization of market frictions builds on the directed competitive search model,
as discussed by Shi, 2002, and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005. We innovate with
respect to this setup by introducing the assumption that workers bear a positive cost of
adjusting applications with respect to random matching. This innovation implies that the
supply of workers to jobs becomes upward sloping, and that ￿rms can use the associated
monopsonistic power to extract rents from workers. These rents can only be washed away
by excessive ￿rm entry.
We have restricted our analysis to the symmetric equilibrium, which we prove to be
existent and unique under some relatively mild restrictions. Our numerical solutions for the
more general model show that optimal tracking time when the labour market is frictional
is generally postponed with respect to the optimal tracking time in a perfectly competitive
labour market. On average, the actual length of educational tracks is also shorter than
that which maximizes total output in a decentralized matching equilibrium However, this
average masks substantive cross country heterogeneity, because in about half of the countries
in our sample, actual tracking length is too long compared with the e¢ cient length, while
the opposite occurs in the remaining half of the sample.
We also ￿nd that, on average, the actual share of pupils in the academic track is much
lower than the level which maximizes total output in a decentralized matching equilibriumCompared
to tracking length, this result is less ambiguous, as the optimal share is always larger than
the actual share. Perhaps more important for the purposes of this paper, we ￿nd that
the output loss incurred by having both a tracking time and a share of students in the
academic track di⁄erent from their optimal values is close to 2 percentage points of total
net output. At the forefront of this paper we asked whether de-tracking secondary schools
has a signi￿cant e¢ ciency cost. Our answer has three parts: ￿rst, we should not take the
competitive labour market as a benchmark, because labour market frictions are a relevant
ingredient of the school to work transition; second, the actual con￿guration of tracking time
and allocation of students to tracks deviates from the optimal con￿guration prevailing in
an imperfect labour market, which entails a sizeable average e¢ ciency loss. Third and last,
while there are countries in our sample where school tracking is too short compared to the
optimum, there are also countries where tracking is too long.
37Tractability has required that we strip down the schooling part of the model consid-
erably, and that we consider a two-period model. In future work, we intend to move to
a multi-period environment, possibly with a richer school structure. The current model
can also be used to explore the consequences on optimal school design induced by the in-
troduction of unexpected productivity shocks, which hit some of the jobs available in the
economy. Typically, a consequence we expect is a higher demand for versatility, which
could lead governments to further de-track secondary schools, independently of equality
considerations21.
21This is not a new question, see for instance Lamo, Messina and Wasmer, 2006.
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Let  be the index of individual job slots. This index is chosen in such a way that job
slots belong to type  if 0 ￿  ￿ ￿ and to type  if ￿   ￿  Denote by ￿() the
application density, which must sum up to unity:
Z 
0
￿() = 1 (A1.1)











is the probability that the application is sent to a type  job slot, and





 = 1 ¬ ￿
is the probability that the application reaches a type  job slot.
We now posit the following cost function

































 ¬   (1 + log())
The second term in the RHS is for normalization, so that if workers set ￿() = 1
 they
do not incur any cost. The cost is strictly positive and it increases without bound if we let
￿() ! 0Denote by () the expected returns from applying to the o⁄er posted by a job













 +   (1 + log()) (A1.3)
subject to (A1.1).
41Let us assume that each type of job slot has a common wage policy, given by 
 and

 for type  workers. The argument is exactly the same for type  workers so we skip it.
Type  worker￿ s problem is reduced to:







where ￿ is Lagrangian multipliers for (A1.1). The ￿rst order condition is
L
￿()






¬ ￿ = 0
so that we have

 ¬ 




























￿() = ￿￿() = 
Z 
￿






































Similarly, for type  workers, we have
42
 ¬ 
 =  
￿
 ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)
 (1 ¬  )
￿
=   ￿( 1 ¬ ￿)
as in the text.
A.2
Proof of Lemma 1
This result is proved in Shimer (2005) when   = 0, but applies more generally. Suppose
that the ￿rm holding the job slot wants to increase the size of the queue of applicants. To
do so, it has to raise the posted wage both to compensate applicants for the decline in their
matching probabilities, and to attract more applicants. Di⁄erently put, an increase in the
queue length is more expensive in terms of wages if   is larger. This in turn reduces the
desired change in the queue length. Thus, the net pro￿t after optimization is a monotone
and concave transformation of gross output, more concave than under competitive search.
More formally, we only prove the Lemma for 
 and 
, since the other cases are similar.
































































































































that both ￿1 and ￿11 are strictly positive, and from rewriting the ￿rst term in the denomi-














































































































































































































































































































which can be re-written as (22) in the text.
A.4
Consider ￿rst the solution of the system of two equations in the symmetric equilibrium.
Start with de￿ning  ￿ ￿1  1 so that  = 
￿1 Also de￿ne 2￿ = 1 ¬ 2. Equation (29)











  (2 ¬ 1)(2 ¬  + 1)
￿





(￿  ) = 0
There also exits a value 1 (1
2  1  1) such that
22
1(1 ¬ 1)2￿
  (21 ¬ 1)(2
1 ¬ 1 + 1)
= 1 (A4.3)
and ￿(1￿  ) ! 1
There exists another cut-o⁄ point 2  1 such that (2￿  ) ! 1 but it lies outside





  ￿ 1 (A4.4)
We have:
1. ￿1
  0 for 1
2    1
2. ￿1
  0 for   2
Inserting ￿(￿  ) in (29) we get:





















22 ¬ 2 + 1
￿2
2￿(￿  )2(1 ¬ )2=  (A4.5)
which can be solved for the remaining unknown, 
For existence, it su¢ ces to notice that the left hand side of (A4.5) goes to 1 as  ! 1
2
and is zero as 1 !
_
1 For unicity, compute the ￿rst derivative of (A4.5) in a piecewise
fashion. Each piece is a line of (A4.5).




  ￿1(24 ¬ 43 + 92 ¬ 7 + 2)
23(1 ¬ )3








1(24 ¬ 53 + 62 ¬ 4 + 1)
3(1 ¬ )(2 ¬  + 1)(2 ¬ 1)
+
2 exp(¬￿1
 )￿1(¬24 + 43 ¬ 92 + 7 ¬ 2)
3(1 ¬ )(2 ¬  + 1)(2 ¬ 1)







(24 ¬ 53 + 62 ¬ 4 + 1)￿1 ¬ (24 ¬ 43 + 92 ¬ 7 + 2)
￿
3(1 ¬ )(2 ¬  + 1)(2 ¬ 1)
46De￿ne
 = (24 ¬ 53 + 62 ¬ 4 + 1) and  = (24 ¬ 43 + 92 ¬ 7 + 2)
Note that in the interval [1



















 = (24 ¬ 53 + 62 ¬ 4 + 1)log
￿
42(1 ¬ )2
(2 ¬ 1)(2 ¬  + 1)
￿
¬ (24 ¬ 43 + 92 ¬ 7 + 2)
which is an expression only in  We have that   0 in [1
21]. Then














  ￿1(22 ¬ 2 + 1)(46 ¬ 145 + 324 ¬ 413 + 342 ¬ 16 + 3)
24(1 ¬ )3(2 ¬  ¬ 1)(2 ¬ 1)
+
+
  (22 ¬ 2 + 1)(¬46 + 125 ¬ 284 + 363 ¬ 272 + 11 ¬ 2)
24(1 ¬ )3(2 ¬  ¬ 1)(2 ¬ 1)
De￿ne
 = (46¬145+324¬413+342¬16+3) and  = (¬46+125¬284+363¬272+11¬2)




  (22 ¬ 2 + 1)
24(1 ¬ )3(2 ¬  ¬ 1)(2 ¬ 1)
[￿1 + ]




(2 ¬ 1)(2 ¬  + 1)
￿
+ 
which depend only on  and it is always negative. Finally






over the entire interval [1
21] provided that ￿








Optimal policy under symmetry is characterized as follows










¬ + ￿(1 ¬ ￿1 ¬ ￿2)
The ￿rst order conditions are:
L
￿1
=   0(￿1)(1 ¬   (￿2)2) +
 
2￿1
¬ ￿ = 0
L
￿1
=   0(￿2)(1 ¬   (￿1))2 +
 
2￿2
¬ ￿ = 0
L

=   (￿1) +   (￿2)(1 ¬   (￿1))2 +
 

¬  ¬ ￿(￿1 + ￿2) = 0
Using the ￿rst and the second equation and eliminating ￿, we get











48The third equation is rewritten as
  (￿1) +   (￿2)(1 ¬   (￿1))2 +
 

= ￿(￿1 + ￿2) + 
= (￿1 + ￿2)
￿





where the equality follows from the ￿rst equation.
Rearranging terms, we get





































1 ¬ (￿1)(1 ¬ 2) ¬ (￿1 + ￿2)2 =  (A5.3)
Using the adding up constraint, we obtain:
exp[¬￿1](1 ¬ 2) =
  (2￿1 ¬ 1)
2￿1(1 ¬ ￿1)
(A5.4)





2 =  (A5.5)
One thing worth noticing is that the ￿rst order condition for vacancy creation does not
depend on   . The impact of   on optimal  is only through the ￿rst order condition on the
length of queues. Equation A5.4 can be interpreted naturally as the equality between the
marginal bene￿t and the marginal cost of adjusting the queue length. The marginal bene￿t
from an increase in ￿1 in this symmetric setting is simply the marginal increase in output; a
small increase in ￿1 raises the probability that a better matching occurs and reduces by the
same amount the probability that the less e⁄ective match occurs. This marginal change in




49and the net incrase in output is simply (2¬1) The cost is an increase in adjustment cost,







Equation A5.5 is also an equality between the marginal cost and bene￿t of vacancy
creation. The marginal cost is  The LHS is the bene￿t and can be interpreted as follows.
An increase in vacancy creation increases the number of job slots but at the same time
reduces proportionately the length of queues ￿1 and ￿2. It is a simple consequence of the
envelope theorem that optimal vacancy creation does not depend directly on   
A.6
Proof of Proposition 4
First, ￿1 is strictly decreasing in  ￿ ￿1 both in (30￿ ) and (32) Moreover, since
  (2 ¬ 1)(2 ¬  + 1)
22(1 ¬ )2 
  (2 ¬ 1)
2(1 ¬ )
the schedule described by (32) lies strictly above the schedule described by (30￿ ): i.e., given
, ￿1 in (30￿ ) is always strictly smaller than ￿1 in (32). While the schedule (31) is also




22 ¬ 2 + 1
￿2
23(1 ¬ )2  0









Proof of Proposition 6
50Insert in the symmetric matching equilibrium equations the socially optimal solution
(￿1 ), to obtain, for the  ¬  match
  0(￿1)(1 ¬ 2) =
 
(1 + )




[￿(1 ¬ 2￿V ￿11 ¬ ￿) + (1 ¬ 2￿V ￿1)￿1 (1 ¬ 2￿V ￿11 ¬ ￿)] (39)
Notice that
1 +  =
¬(￿1 )
  (￿1 )




    (￿1 )
¬(￿1 )
Inserting this expression on the right hand side of (A7.1), we obtain
 
(1 + )




[￿(1 ¬ 2￿V ￿11 ¬ ￿) + (1 ¬ 2￿V ￿1)￿1 (1 ¬ 2￿V ￿11 ¬ ￿)]
= ¬(￿1 )
  (￿1 )
¬(￿1 )
=   (￿1 )
Turning to the tax on vacancy creation, this is such that, for job type 
￿1 = 1 ¬  (￿1)(1 ¬ 2) ¬  (￿1 + ￿2)2 + ￿ ¬ 
= 1 ¬  (￿1)(1 ¬ 2) ¬  (￿1 + ￿2)2 + ￿ ¬ ￿ + ￿
= 1 ¬  (￿1)(1 ¬ 2) ¬  (￿1 + ￿2)2 = 0
QED
51